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Case No. 20050978-CA 
(incarcerated) 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FORBIDDING SULLIVAN TO 
CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE THE STATE'S 
WITNESSES REGARDING THEIR BIAS STEMMING 
FROM A CIVIL SUIT AND INCONSISTENT AND 
EXCULPATORY ALLEGATIONS IN THAT SUIT 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
The State claims in a footnote that there is no evidence that the alleged victim filed 
a civil suit, but after acknowledging that trial counsel submitted a copy of the complaint 
in that suit to the trial court, the State indicates that it will not dispute that the victim filed 
or contemplated filing such a suit. State's brief at 11 n.4. 
Counsel for Sullivan has moved this Court to supplement the record with a copy of 
the complaint from the civil suit, which trial counsel put into the record to preserve Mr. 
Sullivan's claims (R. 213: 180-82). 
The State claims that any error in the trial court's limitation of the cross-
2 
examination of Phyllis Koury and Ian Walston regarding the civil suit was harmless, 
because the jurors were sufficiently aware of their potential biases, and because Debbie 
Dixon's testimony alone was enough to convict Sullivan. State's brief at 14, 18, 21. The 
State argues that any question that might have been posed to Ian Walston regarding the 
civil suit would have been cumulative to those which had already been asked and 
answered. State's brief at 21. The State concludes that given the ample evidence that 
Sullivan caused serious bodily injury to Ian Walston when Sullivan hit him in the jaw, 
any error was harmless. State's brief at 21-22. These arguments are all refuted by 
reference to the complaint. 
In the complaint, Ian Walston sues Kory Sullivan, Matthew Sullivan, and various 
business entities all related to Dimitri's, the bar where the injuries were incurred, and the 
unnamed employees of that bar, referred to as John Does 1 through 10. Inter alia, the 
complaint alleges against the Dimitri's defendants negligence in failing to provide 
adequate security, failing to anticipate or intervene in the attack, serving the Sullivans 
alcohol, failing to call the police or medical assistants in timely fashion, alleges against 
the Sullivan defendants assault and/or battery, and seeks damages exceeding one million 
dollars. See Complaint. 
The lawsuit obviously gave Phyllis Koury a significant bias against Sullivan in his 
criminal case, given that she was supervising security at Dimitri's, and may have been 
viewed as liable (R. 213:55). The suit also gave Walston significant bias against 
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Sullivan, given that Walston was trying to collect over a million dollars from the 
Sullivans, Dimitri's and others. See Complaint. 
With regard to the attack, the complaint alleges: 
13. The Sullivan Defendants and John Doe 1 through 5 Defendants 
began to verbally assault and attack Walston and his companions in a loud, 
obnoxious and observable manner. The Dimitri Defendants and John Doe 6 
through 10 Defendants saw or should have seen these actions, yet did not 
take any steps to calm down the Sullivan Defendants and John Doe 1 
through 5 Defendants, remove them from the premises, separate them from 
Walston and/or prevent the verbal assault from escalating into a violent 
attack. 
14. Neither Walston nor his companions unreasonably responded to 
the verbal attack or did anything to provoke the Sullivan Defendants and 
John Doe 1 through 5 Defendants in any way and in fact took affirmative 
steps to avoid a confrontation and minimize the potential for any problems. 
15. Walston attempted to walk away from the Sullivan Defendants 
and John Doe 1 through 5 Defendants, but after Walston's back was turned 
to them and he was walking away from them, he was violently attacked by 
one or more of the Sullivan Defendants and John Doe 1 through 5 
Defendants, who hit and kicked him repeatedly until, and after, he was lying 
unconscious on the floor. 
Id. 
This account in the complaint contrasts significantly with the testimony of Phyllis 
Koury, that Kory Sullivan pushed his brother Brian into Ian Walston, who asked, "What 
the hell are you doing?" or "What the hell did I do to you?" and that when she stepped in 
between them, Kory Sullivan pushed her and came over her shoulder with a punch to 
Walston's jaw which rendered him unconscious (R. 213:55, 57-58, 62, 73). 
The account in the complaint likewise differs significantly from that of Debbie 
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Dixon, who testified that the punch followed a prior altercation between Walston and 
Brian Sullivan, during which Walston picked up a chair before the surrounding crowd 
yelled at him to put it down, before Kory Sullivan hit him one time and rendered him 
unconscious (R. 213: 87-89, 97). 
The account in the complaint likewise differs significantly from that of Ian 
Walston, who testified that he did nothing to provoke the incident, that he could not recall 
having picked up a chair, but was first hit by Matt Sullivan hard enough that he saw spots, 
and that after Matt slapped him and complete chaos broke out, during which Kory 
Sullivan was trying to hit him, and that he woke up in an ambulance, not knowing who 
had caused his injuries (R. 213: 111-112, 139). Moreover, by implicating five unknown 
other assailants, the complaint further bolstered Sullivan's position that he did not cause 
the extent of injuries sustained by Walston, which constituted an element of second 
degree aggravated assault. 
The complaint not only provided motive for Walston and Koury to incriminate 
Sullivan, but also provided a significantly different version of events than those that were 
presented at trial, which may well have left Sullivan's jurors with reasonable doubts about 
whether they could believe any of the State's witnesses regarding what occurred, and 
whether Sullivan was truly the person who caused Walston's serious bodily injuries. See 
Complaint, supra. 
Given these facts, the State cannot meet its burden to show the constitutional error 
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involved in the violation of Sullivan's confrontation rights harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Particularly given the variances 
in the testimony of the witnesses and the complaint, particularly with regard to who 
caused Ian Walston's injuries, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the 
trial court permitted trial counsel to fully cross-examine Phyllis Koury and Ian Walston 
regarding the civil suit. 
The State claims that Sullivan failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's rulings forbidding trial counsel to cross-examine Phyllis Koury and Ian Walston 
regarding the civil suit filed by Ian Walston. State's brief at 16, 19. 
The marshaling requirement applies when a party seeks to prove a trial court's 
factual findings clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 
2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177. The rulings at issue here include no factual findings, but 
consist of the trial court's sustaining the prosecutor's objection that the question to Koury 
that the prosecutor interrupted was outside the scope of direct and entirely irrelevant (R. 
231: 76), and of the trial court's forbidding trial counsel to cross-examine Walston 
regarding the civil suit, and his complaint therein because it was irrelevant and 
cumulative (R. 231: 140, 188). 
As a matter of law, cross-examination for bias stemming from civil liability is not 
outside the scope of direct or irrelevant. See, e.g., State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1986) and cases cited on pages 12-13 of the State's brief. The State concedes the 
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relevance of such questioning, and never contends that it was beyond the scope of direct 
examination in this case. See State's brief at 12-14. 
By comparing the contents of the complaint with the summary of the State's 
witnesses' testimony, supra, or at pages 5-7 of the State's brief, this Court can readily 
confirm that the civil suit was not cumulative to the evidence presented at trial. 
The State contends that the trial court correctly ruled that trial counsel's questions 
to Phyllis Koury regarding the civil suit were asked and answered multiple times, but fails 
to acknowledge that Ms. Koury began to answer this line of questioning by first claiming 
that no suit had been filed, and then by modifying this testimony to reflect that she had no 
knowledge (R. 213:75-76). 
The State claims that Sullivan has failed to explain how the court's limitation of 
Koury's cross-examination left the jury with the impression that no suit had been filed. 
State's brief at 14. In light of Koury's testimony that no suit had been filed, and that she 
was unaware if one had been (R. 213: 75-77), the record requires no explanation. 
The State claims that trial counsel may not have preserved the issue concerning the 
court's limitation of Ms. Koury's testimony, because he did not respond when the trial 
court sustained the prosecutor's objections, and argued in terms of prosecutorial 
misconduct at the close of the evidence. State's brief at 16 n.7. 
By reviewing the trial transcript, this Court can confirm that the record is 
abundantly clear regarding trial counsel's need to cross-examine Ms. Koury and Mr. 
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Walston regarding the civil suit. In opening statement, trial counsel informed the jurors 
that Mr. Walston had filed a civil suit which would tend to influence his testimony against 
Mr. Sullivan, and that the lawsuit alleged inadequate security at the bar where Walston 
was injured in a melee, and that Phyllis Koury was implicated in the lawsuit, as she would 
be testifying for the bar owners (R. 213: 51-52). 
Given this opening statement, trial counsel's attempts to cross-examine Ms. Koury 
regarding the lawsuit (R. 213: 75-77), and trial counsel's arguments at the close of the 
evidence discussing need to cross-examine for bias (R. 213: 179-181), the trial court was 
sufficiently on notice regarding the need for this testimony that the issue is preserved for 
this Court's review. 
II. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE 
EXCULPATORY PHOTOGRAPH(S) REQUIRES 
REVERSAL. 
The second degree felony aggravated assault charge is premised on the extent of 
Mr. Walston's injuries - his jaw was broken in three places (e.g. R. 213: 49). The State's 
witnesses testified that Sullivan hit Walston one time (e.g. R. 213: 89). It was Sullivan's 
theory of the case that the serious bodily injuries to Walston were inflicted by others in 
the course of a melee in the bar (R. 213: 50). 
In response to Sullivan's claim that the prosecution violated the Brady doctrine by 
failing to provide a photograph showing a shoe print on Mr. Walston's face which might 
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have exculpated Sullivan by showing that someone other than Sullivan inflicted the 
serious injuries on Walston, the State argues that there is no such photograph. State's 
brief at 22-24. 
By turning to R. 213: 42-43, this Court can confirm that defense counsel informed 
the court that there was "much discussion in the discovery matters about a shoe print on 
his face," and that there was a photograph depicting a red mark on Mr. Walston's face (R. 
213: 42-43). The prosecutor did not dispute Mr. Payton's representation regarding the 
contents of discovery, but merely indicated that she had asked her office to send Mr. 
Payton all the photographs the office had, and that she did not have a photograph of a 
shoe print (R. 213:42). 
The fair inference from this interchange is not that the photograph does not exist. 
Rather, the fair inference is that the police had a photograph(s) depicting a red mark 
and/or footprint on Mr. Walston's face, which the police failed to provide to Mr. Payton 
or the prosecutor's office. As is detailed in Sullivan's opening brief, because the police 
are viewed as part of the prosecution team, they are bound by the Brady doctrine to 
provide exculpatory evidence to the defense. See Sullivan's opening brief at 22-23, citing 
Tillman v. State. 2005 UT 56, 128 P.3d 1123; and Kvles v. Whitley. 514 U.S. 418, 438 
(1995). 
The State suggests that there was no Brady violation because the prosecution 
"provided the defense with the information that a nurse thought she observed a shoe 
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print." State's brief at 25. The State argues further that 
In receiving this information, the defense was afforded the opportunity to 
call the nurse if they wished to support a theory that someone else caused 
the injuries. Strategically, the defense chose not to do so. 
State's brief at 25. 
The State's brief is notably lacking citations to the record in this argument, 
but see Utah R. App. P. 24 (e) (requiring citation to the record), likely because the record 
demonstrates that the government's provision of information regarding the nurse occurred 
when Mr. Walston testified that a nurse told him he looked like he had been kicked (R. 
213: 132-33). He testified that he was saying that there were shoeprints on his face, but 
that he did not know if he had been kicked, and could not say if there were shoeprints 
because he did not have a mirror (R. 213: 132-33). 
The government's witness's revealing this information mid-trial is no substitute for 
timely compliance with Brady, and the fact that the witness provided this testimony 
during trial does not fairly translate into a tactical choice to refrain from calling the nurse 
mentioned in Mr. Walston's testimony. See Sullivan's opening brief at 20-21 (citing 
cases to the effect that the government must provide exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence in time to accommodate effective trial preparation). 
This Court should reject the State's suggestion that trial counsel abandoned the 
issue, State's brief at 24, because trial counsel properly brought the trial court's attention 
to the fact that the discovery repeatedly discussed a shoe print on Mr. Walston's face, 
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which was not attributed to Mr. Sullivan (R. 213: 42). After the trial court interrupted 
counsel mid-objection, and informed him that the prosecutor would not be introducing 
any such photograph, counsel again argued that a Detective Park had discussed a 
photograph of a red mark on Mr. Walston's face, but had been unable to substantiate that 
anyone had caused the mark (R. 213: 43). The court again reiterated her resolution of the 
matter, indicating that the prosecution would introduce no such photo in the State's case 
(R. 213:43). 
In this State, it is not required of defense attorneys to continue to dispute a judge's 
ruling once it has been made. As Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
explains, 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the 
reasons therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, 
the absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him. 
In the instant matter, trial counsel stated his objections to the extent permitted by 
the trial court, and the issue is therefore preserved. See id. 
III. THE JURY SELECTION ERRORS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 
THE COURT'S CUMULATIVE ERROR ANALYSIS. 
In response to Sullivan's claim that the trial court's refusal to remove two jurors 
for cause constitutes reversible error, particularly under the cumulative error doctrine, the 
State claims that the cumulative error doctrine has "nothing to do with preservation," and 
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that because trial counsel removed the two challenged jurors with peremptory strikes, 
affirmance is mandatory under the "cure or waive" rule of State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 398 (Utah 1994). See State's brief at 26-27. 
Because trial counsel properly challenged the jurors for cause, and then removed 
them with peremptory strikes, he did all he possibly could to preserve the error, and the 
State is not arguing waiver. Thus, preservation is not at issue on this point. Even if it 
were, the cumulative error doctrine does bear on issues of preservation, inasmuch as the 
doctrine permits courts to grant relief on appeal on the basis of the cumulative effects of 
all errors, even those which are not identified, but are "assumed" by the court. E.g. State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
This Court should reject the State's rigid application of the "cure or waive" rule of 
Menzies, supra, and should consider the jury selection errors in the context of a 
cumulative error analysis, because State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, 
establishes that, even after Menzies, it is entirely appropriate for courts to consider the 
cumulative effect of jury selection errors, regardless of whether the defendant did his best 
to cure the trial courts errors by expending his peremptory challenges. Id. at ^ 52-55. 
In this case, trial counsel's challenges for cause were well based, given the obvious 
biases attaching to the prospective jurors. Juror Kennedy was properly challenged for 
cause because he had been the victim of a very similar crime to that charged - he was 
attacked and had his nose broken (R. 213: 40). See, e ^ , State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 
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442 (Utah App. 1991) (jurors who have experienced crimes similar to those at issue are 
presumptively biased; trial court must either grant challenge for cause or rebut 
presumption of bias through detailed voir dire). Juror Johnson was properly challenged 
for cause because she had been the victim of a rape ten days prior to the trial and was in 
the process of working with the State to prosecute her assailant (R. 213: 41). See, e.g., 
Ut. R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4) ("The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable 
or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because the juror is indebted to or employed by the state or 
a political subdivision thereof55). 
Judge Atherton rejected both challenges for cause out of hand, in both instances 
because the jurors said they could be impartial (R. 213: 41-42). By reviewing the voir 
dire, this Court can readily confirm that Judge Atherton indeed relied on the jurors5 own 
assessment of their biases, because she did not ask detailed questions to probe their biases 
herself (R. 213: 14, 18). 
The trial court's perfunctory resolution is inappropriate. As the court stated in 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 952 P.2d 991, 
We now make emphatically clear that a juror's statement alone that he or 
she can decide a case fairly pursuant to the law given by the trial court is 
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not a sufficient basis for qualifying a juror to sit when the prospective 
juror's answers provide evidence of possible bias and the trial court does not 
allow further questions designed to probe the extent and the depth of the 
bias. Preventing such further inquiry and concluding the issue by taking a 
juror's conclusory statement that he or she will not be affected by a 
particular attitude or will decide the case fairly is not sufficient. 
Id. at 1f 36, 
Given Saunders' unmistakable directives, this Court is fully entitled to and should 
consider the cumulative impact of the jury selection errors in deciding whether a new trial 
is required. See id. at ^ 52-54, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should order a new trial wherein Sullivan's rights to confrontation are 
honored, wherein the Government complies with its duties to provide exculpatory 
evidence, and wherein jury selection is conducted in a manner to insure the fairness of the 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this / (^ day of / I t A ^ S i 2006. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
By: Rdhald J. Ye 
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